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REDISCOVERING NONJUSTICIABILITY: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
IMPEACHMENTS AFfER NIXON 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDTt 
INTRODUCTION 
Few constitutional canons are criticized more often than the 
political question doctrine. It has been called "deceptive,"1 "un-
warranted,"2 "an enigma,"3 "useless,"4 and "mixed up and incon-
sistent."5 The fact that in the thirty years after the Supreme Court 
set forth the modern political question doctrine6 it found only one 
such question7 and did not identify any in fourteen other cases8 
t Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and 
Mary. B.A. Yale University; M.Sc. London School of Economics; J.D. University of Chi-
cago. This Article was prepared as part of a study I conducted under contract as a spe-
cial consultant to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal. Although 
the analysis does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission members or staff, I 
am grateful to the Commission members and staff, especially Director Michael 
Remington, for their probing questions and helpful suggestions, all of which enriched my 
thinking. I am also grateful for the helpful comments and other assistance I have re-
ceived from Rebecca Brown, Cynthia Farina, Jill Fisch, Peter Shane, Steve Shiffrin, and 
Ron Wright. 
1. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale LJ. 597, 622 
(1976). 
2. Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the 
Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 397 (1983}. 
3. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1031, 1031 (1985). 
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6, at 127 (1989}. 
5. Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other 
Nixon v. United States, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 153. 
6. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962}. 
7. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1973}. 
8. See Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 1425-26 (1992); Unit-
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confirmed doubts about the doctrine's viability. In 1993, when the 
Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States9 found that a challenge 
to the Senate's use of a special committee to do factfinding for an 
impeachment trial posed a political question, there was therefore 
reason to consider the decision a milestone in constitutional law. 
Yet, the response to Nixon has been either condemnation10 or 
silence. 
This reaction is troubling .. The silence might reflect a begrudg-
ing or widespread acceptance of a practice as old as the 
Constitution of conducting federal impeachments without subse-
quent judicial review. On the other hand, condemnation might 
suggest that the faith of many constitutional law scholars in 
judicial review may be so deep-seated that they are not prepared 
to deal with the implications of a revived political question doc-
trine even if it were limited to the context of impeachment.11 
In fact, Nixon· is significant for two reasons. First, it breathed 
life back into the much-maligned political question doctrine, com-
prising the Court's practice of claiming textual authority, separa-
tion of powers concerns, and prudential reasons for not deciding 
the merits of certain constitutional questionsY In doing so, the 
Court took a position on an issue-the justiciability of im-
peachment challenges-that had long divided constitutional schol-
ed States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-96 (1990); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 
102 (1989); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 
(1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986); County of Oneida v. Oneida 
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50 (1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983); 
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977): Elrod v. Bums, 
427 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7, 11 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-49 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964). 
9. 113 s. Ct. 732, 740 (1993). 
10. Brown, supra note 5, at 126 (criticizing Nixon for not respecting judicial review 
as an integral part of a meaningful separation of powers doctrine to protect judicial inde-
pendence and individual rights). 
11. This attitude was evident in the bulk of the commentary written in the months 
just prior to Nixon urging the Court to treat challenges to impeachment procedures as 
justiciable. See, e.g., David 0. Stewart, Impeachment by Ignorance, A.B.A. J., June 1990, 
at 52, 54; Rose Auslander, Note, Impeaching the Senate's Use of Trial Committees, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 68, 68-69 (1992); Brendan C. Fox, Note, Impeachment: The Justiciability 
of Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Trials, 60 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 1275, 1308-09 (1992); Daniel Luchsinger, Note, Committee Impeachment Trials: 
The Best Solution?, 80 GEO. LJ. 163, 164 (1991). 
12. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 2.15 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing the political question doctrine). 
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ars13 and is basic for understanding the limits of judicial review. 
Nixon was particularly surprising because it was premised on the 
Framers' strong distrust of the federal judiciary as an impartial or 
competent impeachment authority. Second, Nixon recognized that 
in the area of impeachment, Congress may make constitutional 
law-i.e., make judgments about the scope and meaning of its 
constitutionally authorized impeachment functions-subject to 
change only if it later changes its mind or by a constitutional 
amendment. Thus, Nixon raised the issue of whether, without 
judicial review, Congress is able to make constitutional decisions 
in a reasonably principled fashion. 
This Article explores these ramifications of Nixon as well as 
the most difficult questions it left open about the prospects for 
judicial review of impeachment challenges. It aims to show that no 
area of constitutional law needs to be nonjusticiable more than 
impeachment, that impeachment is the best example of a political 
question, because the textual, historical, and structural bases for its 
nonjusticiability are stronger than those for any other area, includ-
13. Compare CHARLES BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 53-64 (1974) (arguing 
that judicial review of impeachment is inconsistent with the Constitution) and Ronald D. 
Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. LJ. 
707, 728 (1987-1988) (noting that impeachment raises issues that satisfy each element of 
a political question as set forth by the Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) 
with RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-21 (1973) 
(arguing that constitutional questions, including legislative-executive conflicts, are justicia-
ble) and IRVlNG BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 183-87 (1972) (comparing 
judicial review of impeachment and bills of attainder) and Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hege-
mony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 
UCLA L. REv. 30 (1974) (arguing that the Burger Court erred in not treating as a 
political question President Nixon's asserted claim of executive privilege in the Watergate 
tapes case) and John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitu-
tional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 57 (1970) (questioning legislative definition of 
impeachable offense) and Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 
MICH. L. REv. 49, 57 (1989) (arguing that Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), 
compels the conclusion that such questions are justiciable). 
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ing foreign affairs.14 In other words, impeachment and the politi-
cal question doctrine make each other possible. 
For background, Part I reviews Nixon. Part II explores 
Nixon's impact on the status of the political question doctrine. 
Part III examines the two major prospects after Nixon for judicial 
review of an impeachment challenge. These include limiting judi-
cial review of impeachments altogether and confining it to claims 
based on violations of explicit restraints. Part IV makes the case 
for barring any judicial review of impeachments. This argument is 
based on an analysis of the implications of judicial review of the 
most significant impeachment challenges likely to arise in the 
future. These potential claims relate to (1) the applicability of the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause; (2) the Senate's failure to 
comply with procedural rules such as a uniform burden of proof 
or set of evidentiary rules; and (3) procedural irregularities in 
presidential impeachment trials. Part IV suggests that the nonjusti-
ciability of each of these challenges depends on the fact-not suf-
ficiently emphasized in the literature on impeachment or political 
questions-that the Court may not exercise judicial review over an 
impeachment because Article III precludes it, i.e., that the Court 
has neither original nor appellate jurisdiction over any 
impeachment matter. Part IV concludes further that the nonjustici-
ability of all impeachment challenges is reinforced by the 
inextricable link between impeachment and the political question 
doctrine as components of the separation of powers. 
14. In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the justiciability of foreign 
affairs. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND REsPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS 
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFI'ERMATH 55-58 (1993); see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLmCAL 
QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 
(1992) (arguing that foreign affairs should be justiciable); Linda Champlin & Alan 
Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 231 (1985); Redish, supra note 3, at 1052; Michael E. Tigar, 
Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. 
REV. 1135, 1152 (1970); Lawrence R. Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional, 
Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REV. 449, 479 (1968). Nevertheless, 
the nonjusticiability of foreign affairs is more problematic than that of impeachment, 
because neither the text nor the history of the Constitution makes the former the exclu-
sive domain of any one branch, and the Framers never discussed the incompatibility of 
judicial involvement with foreign affairs as they did with impeachment. 
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I. THE NIXON OPINION 
Walter Nixon, a former federal district judge who was convict-
ed of making false statements before ·a federal grand jury, sought 
judicial review of his subsequent removal from office by impeach-
ment.15 He challenged the constitutionality of the Senate's use of 
a special committee to receive evidence and take testimony re-
garding his impeachment rather than conducting a full hearing 
before the entire Senate.16 His essential claim was that the Sen-
ate rule authorizing discretionary use of a special trial commit-
tee17 violated the constitutional command in Article I that the 
full Senate "try" all impeachments.18 His case required the Court 
to consider for the first time the propriety of judicial review of 
impeachment proceedings. 
Six Justices held Nixon's claim to be nonjusticiable. They 
found that the word "try" does not represent an "implied 
limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in 
trying impeachments."19 In their opinion, that word "lacks 
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of 
review of the Senate's actions,"20 especially when contrasted with 
the three "precise" limitations set out in the Impeachment Trial 
Clause21-that Senate members shall "be on Oath or Affirma-
tion," that the Chief Justice shall preside when the President is 
tried, and that conviction requires a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers present.22 Moreover, other language in the same clause 
giving the Senate the "sole" power to try impeachments was held 
to constitute a "textual commitment" to a coordinate branch.23 
Finally, the Court emphasized that judicial review is inappropriate 
for several reasons: it would upset the Framers' decision to allo-
cate to different fora the power to try impeachments and 
15. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993). 
16. Id. 
17. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANuAL, S. Doc. No. 1, lOlst 
Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1989) (Senate Impeachment Rule XI). 
18. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
19. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736. 
20. Id. 
21. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
22. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736. 
23. See id. at 735-36. 
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crimes;24 it would disturb the system of checks and balances, 
under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the 
judiciary;25 and it would create a "lack of finality and [a] 
difficulty [in] fashioning relief."26 
The Court distinguished Powell v. McCormack?-1 on the 
grounds that it involyed a constitutional provision stating that 
"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and 
Qualifications of its own Members,"28 which is limited by Article 
I, Section 2, which "specifies three requirements for membership 
in the House: The candidate must be at least 25 years of age, a 
citizen of the United States for no less than seven years, and an 
inhabitant of the State he is chosen to represent."29 Hence, "[t]he 
decision as to whether a member satisfied these qualifications was 
placed with the House, but the decision as to what [they] consist-
ed of was not."30 By contrast, the Impeachment Trial Clause con-
tains no separate provision that "could be defeated by allowing 
the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word 
'try.' ,31 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice White, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, thought the case presented a justiciable question, 
though in his view of the merits the Senate had "very wide discre-
tion in specifying impeachment trial procedures,"32 so that as a 
practical matter a successful judicial challenge was unlikely. Still, 
Justice White believed that proper checks and balances are best 
preserved when Senate impeachment trials help control the largely 
unaccountable judiciary, "even as judicial review would ensure that 
the Senate adher:ed to a minimal set of procedural standards in 
conducting impeachment trials."33 The requirement that the 
Senate "try" impeachments creates judicially manageable 
standards, which would be violated "[w]ere the Senate, for exam-
ple, to adopt the practice of automatically entering a judgment of 
24. Id. at 738. 
25. Id. at 738-39. 
26. Id. at 739. 
27. 395 u.s. 486 (1969). 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
29. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739-40. 
30. Id. at 740. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 741 (White, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 743. 
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conviction whenever articles of impeachment were delivered from 
the House."34 
Concurring separately in the judgment, Justice Souter agreed 
with the Couq that the case presented a nonjusticiable political 
question, but he thought that the determination should be made 
on a case-by-case basis. If the Senate were to convict upon a coin 
toss, or upon a summary determination that the official was a 
"bad guy" (Justice Souter borrowed this example from Justice 
White), "judicial interference might well be appropriate."35 
II. PUTIING NIXON INTO PERSPECTIVE 
T_he significance of Nixon is best illustrated by fixing its place 
in the development of the political question doctrine. This analysis 
demonstrates that Nixon added critical momentum to one side of 
the long-standing debate on the constitutional authority for judicial 
recognition of political questions. This inquiry also sets the stage 
for assessing Nixon's impact on the justiciability of future impeach-
ment challenges. 
A. The Origins of the Political Question Doctrine 
The Court first recognized the concept of a political question 
in Marbury v. Madison.36 In that case, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall explained that the Constitution invests "the president . . . 
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he 
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country 
in his political character and to his own conscience. . . . The sub-
jects are political .... [B]eing intrusted to the executive, the deci-
sion of the executive is ~onclusive.'m "Questions in their nature 
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to 
the executive, can never be made in this court."38 Chief Justice 
Marshall contrasted political questions with cases in which 
individual rights were at stake; the latter, according to the Court, 
never could be political questions.39 Thus, in Chief Justice Mar-
34. ld. at 744. 
35. Id. at 748 (Souter, J., concurring). 
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch} 137, 165-67 (1803). 
37. Id. at 165. 
38. Id. at 170. 
39. Id. 
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shall's opinion, the political question doctrine was narrow: it in-
cluded only matters over which the President had unlimited 
discretion and with respect to which there was consequently no 
allegation of a constitutional violation. For example, the Constitu-
tion does not constrain the President's choice about whom to 
appoint to the federal judiciary. 
The ensuing debate over the political question doctrine has 
reflected a basic contest over the legitimacy and scope of judicial 
review in a democratic society. Among the more notable figures in 
this polemic in the twentieth century were Herbert Wechsler and 
Alexander Bickel. In the late 1950s, Wechsler argued for an un-
qualified duty of judicial review in every constitutional case.40 In 
his view, the rule of law in this country is coextensive with judicial 
review, which is indispensable for the recognition and enforcement 
of all constitutional limitations and guarantees. He believed federal 
courts should issue opinions on the constitutional allotments of 
political discretion and thereby preserve their exclusive function of 
constitutional interpretation.41 As Chief Justice Marshall recog-
nized in Marbury, it is the special "province and duty of the ju-
dicial department to say what the law is."42 Thus, for Wechsler, 
courts had to interpret the impeachment clauses, like all constitu-
tional provisions, to ensure compliance with the Constitution and 
to effectuate the separation of powers.43 
In contrast, Bickel contended that the political question doc-
trine was the culmination of the "passive virtues," the devices that 
allow a court to decide when not to decide.44 He explained that 
the legitimate exercise of judicial review in a democracy rests to a 
significant degree on a court's ability to articulate the "enduring 
values" of a soqiety.45 Thus legitimated, courts performing judicial 
review undertake not just a "checking function" to keep each of 
the elected branches from abridging individual liberties or making 
itself stronger at the expense of another branch, but also a "legiti-
mating function," by rallying support for particular legal positions 
40. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 13 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 2-3 (1959). 
41. Id. at 7-8. 
42. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
43. See Wechsler, supra note 40, at 8. 
44. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS 183-97 (2d ed. 1986). 
45. Id. at 23-27. 
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and by symbolizing the power and continuity of the Constitution 
itself.46 
Consequently, in Bickel's view, courts must phrase their opin-
ions carefully and know when to stay their hand or remain silent 
as they wait for principle to ripen in the face of necessary political 
compromise.47 The political question doctrine is just one of a 
number of "techniques that allow leeway to expediency without 
abandoning principle ... 48 More precisely, the doctrine comprises 
questions about which we believe "that even though there are 
applicable rules, these rules should be only among the numerous 
relevant considerations.'>49 The possibility of decision on principle 
exists, but it must yield to the necessity of national security or the 
limits of political consensus.50 
At about the same time Bickel published the book in which 
he made these arguments, the Court decided Baker v. Carr,51 
setting forth the modem test for finding a political question. Ac-
cording to the Court, a political question exists only when a case 
involves 
on the surface . . . a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question.52 
The Court concluded that "no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the 
ground of a political question's presence, is appropriate without at 
least one of these elements.53 The Court also conceded, however, 
that "courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy 
46. Id. at 29-33. 
47. See id. at 70-71. 
48. Id. at 71. 
49. Id. at 185 (citation omitted). 
50. Id. at 186-87. 
51. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
52. Id. at 217. 
53. Id. 
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as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitu-
tional authority."54 
The Court's reluctance over the next thirty years to recognize 
political questions fueled criticisms of the doctrine. First, some crit-
ics argued that "the political question doctrine should play no role 
whatsoever in the exercise of ... judicial review."55 They con-
tended that the judicial role is to enforce the Constitution, arguing 
that matters are placed in the Constitution to insulate them from 
majoritarian control and that the political branches should there-
fore not be trusted to enforce any part of the document meant to 
constrain them. Instead, in their view, judicial review exists to 
enforce and effectuate the Constitution. 
Second, other critics rejected Bickel's depiction of the fragility 
of the Court's legitimacy. They maintained that the Court's credi-
bility is resilient, that there is no proof that specific rulings affect 
the judiciary's legitimacy, and that the federal courts' mission is to 
uphold the Constitution in spite of any adverse political reaction 
to its opinions.56 
Third, some critics argued that the political question doctrine 
confuses deference with abdication. In their view, the finding of a 
nonjusticiable political question is a shorthand label for a court's 
real conclusion that there was no constitutional violation, or that 
the government defendant did not exceed the bounds of the dis-
cretionary authority assigned to it by the Constitution.57 For ex-
ample, in an influential 1976 article, Professor Louis Henkin 
claimed to have discovered a trend in which federal courts' find-
ings of political questions 
54. Id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983) ("[T]he presence of 
constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the 
political question doctrine."). 
55. Redish, supra note 3, at 1033; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE 
CONsriTUTION 99-105 (1987). 
56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 133-38. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONsriTUTIONAL LAw 96-107 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the political question 
doctrine). 
57. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 601, 605-06; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, 
at 101-m. Cf. Dellinger, supra note 2, at 397-98, 411 (suggesting that the Court erred in 
not finding judicial supervision of amendment process warranted); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judi· 
cial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 15 YALE L.J. 517, 566 
(1966) (arguing that no principled explanation exists for the Court's political question 
cases). 
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required no . . . extra-ordinary abstention from judicial review; 
they called only for the ordinary respect by the courts for the 
political domain. Having reviewed, the Court refused to invali-
date the challenged actions because they were within the con~ti­
tutional authority of [the] President or Congress .... [It gave] 
"effect to what the political branches have done because they 
had political authority under the Constitutiou to do it."58 
241 
Even with regard to "the unique [textual] instance, '[t]he Senate 
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,' " Professor 
Henkin claimed that "while the Senate alone is to be the judge in 
impeachment proceedings, the courts can review how it does it, at 
least for constitutional excesses or infirmities."59 
B. The Status of the Political Question Doctrine in the Aftermath 
of Nixon 
In dismissing Nixon's challenge to his removal as posing a 
nonjusticiable political question, the Nixon Court rejected the tra-
ditional critiques of the political question doctrine.60 Even so, nei-
58. Henkin, supra note 1, at 601 (footnote omitted). In her post-Nixon survey of 
political question cases, Professor Brown identifies a different trend. She claims that in 
cases in which the Court has dismissed a challenge on political question grounds, the 
Court has held 
a matter to be nonjusticiable on political-question grounds only where the 
standing of the claimant, broadly conceived, or the concreteness of the claim 
can itself be said to be questionable or uncertain. When the standing of the 
claimant and concreteness of the claimed injury are not in question, the courts 
have generally not found adjudication to be precluded by the political-question 
doctrine. 
Brown, supra note 5, at 144-45. 
59. Henkin, supra note 1, at 605 n.26. Another criticism of the political question 
doctrine is that Baker v. Carr does not set forth "useful criteria for deciding what subject 
matter presents a nonjusticiable political question." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.6, at 
126. For example, the text of the Constitution does not state that Congress and the 
President should decide whether a particular action constitutes a constitutional violation. 
Nor does the Constitution mention judicial review or limit it by creating "textually de-
monstrable .•. commitment[s]" to other branches of government. Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Similarly, many important constitutional provisions are written in 
broad, open-textured langUage and do not entail "judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards." Id. 
60. In the 1991 Term, the Court set the stage for Nixon by rejecting the suggestion 
that a political question existed when, and only when, there was no constitutional viola-
tion. See Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415 (1992). The Court de-
clared that "[i]n invoking the political question doctrine, a court acknowledges the possi-
bility that a constitutional provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a decision is 
of course very different from determining that specific congressional action does not 
violate the Constitution." Id. at 1425 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the Court in 
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ther Nixon nor the doctrine it reaffirmed is immune to attack. In 
the most significant attack thus far on Nixon, Professor Rebecca 
Brown argues that the separation of powers exists to protect indi-
vidual rights, that judicial review is an integral part of the separa-
tion of powers, and that the Nixon Court should therefore have 
"permit[ted] judicial review of the exercise of the impeachment 
power" to ensure that no individual right was being violated.61 
The individual right at risk in an impeachment is a federal judge's 
potential loss of position, including the independence she is other-
wise guaranteed by Article III. 62 
Moreover, the Court did not reconcile the apparent irony of 
its reviewing the contours of an area of political decisionmaking to 
preserve the area from judicial review in the name of nonjustici-
ability with its refusal to acknowledge thatJ.ts deference may have 
turned on an implicit judgment that the Constitution simply grants 
the political actor broad discretion. In addition, the Court's reli-
ance on constitutional and prudential factors63 in dismissing 
Nixon's claim as a "political question" may have cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the Court's inquiry. The concern is that the political 
question doctrine may have enlarged the judiciary's role in decid-
ing constitutional questions because it has allowed courts to use 
disingenuous analysis to reach certain results or to make constitu-
tional decisions on a basis not clearly linked to the text, structure, 
or history of the Constitution. 64 
There are three responses to these problems. First, the Court 
referred to a finding of "nonjusticiab[ility]"-a constitutionally 
compelled conclusion barring judgment on a dispute's merits-as 
Montana held that the case, which involved the constitutionality of a reapportionment 
scheme adopted by Congress for the House of Representatives, was justiciable, because it 
was no different from Baker. Id. at 1425-26. 
61. Brown, supra note 5, at 138. 
62. Id. at 137. 
63. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735-40 (1993). 
64. Judge Raymond Randolph took this position in Nixon's case before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He characterized the political 
question doctrine as "amorphous" and as 
ultimately . . • conferring on the courts a rather large role in impeachments 
although the Framers intentionally excluded the judiciary •.•. I view the con-
trolling question as whether the judiciary can pass upon the validity of the 
Senate's procedural decisions. My conclusion that the courts have no such role 
to play in the impeachment process ultimately rests on my interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted), affd, 113 S. Ct. at 732. 
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the functional equivalent of discovering a "political question."65 
This reference may reflect a strategic decision to preserve a major-
ity committed to avoiding the merits of the case despite wide-
spread criticism of the political question doctrine. Some Justices 
might not have minded that the political question doctrine was 
judicially created and allows consideration of the consequences of 
judicial review, whereas others might have felt more comfortable 
viewing their inquiry as being guided solely by the Constitution's 
limits on justiciability. Even so, Nixon emphasized the textual, 
historical, and structural arguments supporting the Court's finding 
of nonjusticiability.66 The Court also stressed that the term "try" 
does not offer "an identifiable textual limit on the authority which 
is committed to the Senate."67 
The Court found further that prolonged court battles over an 
impeachment would create uncertainty ~bout its finality and as to 
"what relief a court may give other than simply settiilg aside the 
judgment of the conviction. Could it order the reinstatement of a 
convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional 
judgeship if the seat had been filled in the interim?"68 Hence, the 
Court's opinion in Nixon relied on prudential concerns related to 
the possible consequences of certain constitutional decisions, as 
well as on arguments based on the text, structure, and history of 
the Constitution. In other words, Nixon did not bury the political 
question doctrine; rather, Nixon resuscitated it by clarifying both 
its derivation from the Constitution and its sensitivity to the need 
for constitutional stability. 
Second, the idea that a federal court may have to exercise 
some degree of judicial review in order to determine the existence 
of a political question is hardly a reason to jettison the entire 
enterprise as deceptive or confusing. In explaining his willingness 
to reach the merits of Nixon's claim in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Harry Edwards quoted 
my observation in 1989 that 
65. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735. 
66. See id. at 738-40. 
67. Id. at 740. 
68. Id. at 739; see also id. (expressing concerns that litigation over impeachment 
could "expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos") 
(quoting Nixon, 938 F.2d at 246). 
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[t]he lesson of Powell is that the Supreme Court may use judicial 
review to determine whether Congress followed the proper proce-
dure for making the political decision committed to it by the 
Constitution. Powell does not allow overly intrusive judicial re-
view, but rather allows review solely to ensure that Congress 
made the particular kind of political decision entrusted to it by 
the Constitution. 69 
Judge Edwards proceeded to find that Nixon's challenge required 
the appellate court to determine the scope of the term "try" and, 
therefore, to reach a ruling on the merits of the lawsuit's conten-
tions?0 Yet, my statement, admittedly not as clear as it should 
have been, was meant to support the opposite conclusion. It recog-
nized that in determining whether a case poses a political question, 
a court may look to see if Congress is in fact exercising the power 
it claims to be. If Congress is using inappropriate means to 
achieve a legitimate objective, then further judicial intervention is 
permissible. Moreover, in a political question case, a court does 
not just look at the contours of a particular area of political deci-
sionmaking and decide to defer to any decision made within that 
sphere because it is constitutional; rather, a court exercises judicial 
review to determine the scope or boundaries of an area about 
whose subject matter it should not express any opinion. 
Viewed in this manner, the determination of a political ques-
tion requires a court to make the kind of decision it must routine-
ly make in adjudicating preliminary issues about the ripeness or 
mootness of a lawsuit, personal jurisdiction, and standing. The 
obvious consequence of a finding that none of the essential criteria 
for a lawsuit to qualify as a case or controversy are present is that 
a court dismisses the case without a decision on the merits, even 
though in reaching such a conclusion, it must appreciate the nature 
of the particular dispute and speculate on the applicability of a 
wide variety of constitutional and prudential concerns. The kind of 
inquiry required to determine a political question is no less appro-
priate than any other preliminary inquiry undertaken in a federal 
case to determine the propriety of adjudicating its merits.71 
69. Nixon, 938 F.2d at 255 n.6 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its 
Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1, 99-100 (1989)). 
70. ld. at 255-59. 
71. Professor Brown argues that "[t]he interests [the political question doctrine] might 
or should serve, such as judicial respect for the processes of the coordinate branches and 
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To be sure, the distinction is subtle between reaching the 
merits of a dispute because it falls within an area over which a 
court decides that some political actor has extensive constitutional 
authority and not reviewing the substantive merits of a political 
actor•s decision because it is within a sphere about which a court 
may not express any opinion.72 Nevertheless, a finding of nonjus-
ticiability is not disingenuous, result-oriented, or a substitute for a 
court•s admission of weakness. Such a finding is different from a 
court•s deciding that a wide realm of governmental behavior is 
constitutional in that a determination of nonjusticiability forecloses 
a range of potential litigation and signals once and for all that 
efficient use of judicial capital, can be protected adequately by thoughtful adherence to 
the principles of standing." Brown, supra note 5, at 127. She suggests that in determining 
whether a particular case actually involves a political question, the Court has relied on 
standing criteria, "including allegation[s] of injury, causation, and redressability by the 
courts" and that when these factors were present, the Court had declined to find a politi-
cal question, until Nixon. Id. at 154; see also supra note 52. 
Professor Brown's proposal is problematic for three reasons. First, her determina-
tion that the results of the Court's political question cases would not have been any 
different had the Court used the right ·analysis, with the possible exception of Nixon, 
casts doubt on the extent to which her suggestion would clarify the law of either the 
political question doctrine or standing. Brown, supra note 5, at 154. She suggests that her 
proposal would make constitutional law more lucid, id. at 126-27, but the standing doc-
trine has long been as harshly criticized as the political question doctrine for being easily 
manipulated and result-oriented. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.3, at 48-49. Sec-
ond, she never explains how Nixon would have been decided differently under her notion 
of the right approach. Near the beginning of her article, she argues that "[t]he Court 
would have more faithfully effectuated the constitutional design by permitting judicial 
review of the Senate action, even while perhaps granting substantial deference on the 
merits." Brown, supra note 5, at 127. At the end of her article, she suggests there was 
"a clear claim to standing" in Nixon. Id. at 154. Yet, the source of her deference is not 
clear, especially given the possible involvement of an individual right. Nor does she ex-
plain how Nixon might have had standing but still had to lose on the merits. The prob-
lem is that it is unclear how her analysis clarifies constitutional law any more than an 
alternative approach under which one would accept the political question doctrine but 
find a judicially manageable standard by which to resolve the case. Cf. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. 
at 74~5 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the word "try" in U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2, 
cl. 6 provides a judicially manageable standard for resolving the case). Third, Professor 
Brown's approach allows for greater judicial interference with the impeachment process 
than the original understanding and structure of the Constitution permit. See infra notes 
79-83 and accompanying text. 
72. Cf. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 741 (White, J., concurring): 
It will likely make little difference whether the Court's or my view controls this 
case. This is so because the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying im-
peachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate 
would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed 
a trial by reasonable judges. 
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there is no judicial remedy available for any official misconduct 
within a certain area. 
Of course, a federal court needs constitutional authority to 
dismiss a constitutional case permanently without a ruling on its 
merits. Accordingly, the third argument favoring the political ques-
tion doctrine is that the Constitution demands such a result. If the 
national government in fact is, as Chief Justice Marshall observed 
in M'Culloch v. Maryland,13 one of "enumerated powers,"74 then 
it should follow that the federal judiciary is, like the other branch-
es, subject to certain constraints, even self-imposed ones. Yet, 
many of the critics of the political question doctrine seem uncom-
fortable with having any branch other than the judiciary declare 
what the Constitution means; they would prefer that federal judges 
have the final say on the constitutional limitations of every govern-
mental action. No decision more clearly indicates the fallacy of 
this notion, however, than Nixon. It recognized that the Constitu-
tion limits even federal judicial power. In other words, it may be 
the special duty of federal courts to "say what the law is,"75 but 
sometimes the law is that it is improper for a court to decide the 
merits of a particular constitutional issue. 
Nor does the Constitution necessarily support the notion that 
it has meaning only as long as the judiciary is empowered to en-
force all of its guarantees or limits. Judicial review may be neces-
sary to make the enforcement and vindication of various federal 
rights and limitations possible, but that acknowledgment does not 
establish a constitutional basis for judicial review over every case 
or controversy implicating the Constitution. 
For example, the constitutional basis for not reaching the 
merits of Nixon's claim underscores the textual, historical, and 
structural grounds for a court's finding a political question. As the 
Nixon Court acknowledged, judicial review over impeachment pro-
cedures frustrates the original constitutional scheme in which the 
Framers foresaw impeachment as the only political check on the 
judiciary.76 The Court observed further that the parties had not 
offered "evidence of a single word in the history of the Constitu-
tional Convention or in contemporary commentary that even al-
73. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
74. /d. at 405. 
75. Scharpf, supra note 57, at 518. 
76. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736. 
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ludes to the possibility of judicial review in the context of the 
impeachment powers.'m The Court found this "silence" revealing, 
because it is at odds with "the several explicit references to the 
availability of judicial review as a check on the Legislature's power 
with respect to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and stat-
utes."78 
Moreover, the Framers expressed several reasons for excluding 
any role for federal judges as decisionmakers in the impeachment. 
process. The Framers wanted the body empowered to try impeach-
ments to be sufficiently numerous and to have suffiCient fortitude 
and public accountability to make the necessary policy choices in 
an impeachment.79 The Framers also designed the impeachment 
process to protect the target of an impeachment from being pun-
ished for the same offense twice by preventing judges from being 
able to administer or oversee both an individual's impeachment 
trial and separate criminal proceeding.80 Moreover, the Framers 
sought to preclude the "eviscerat[ion]" of impeachment as an 
"'important constitutional check' placed on the Judiciary,"81 
which would result from placing the "final reviewing authority with 
respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the 
impeachment process is meant to regulate," and to fashion explicit . 
"constitutional safeguards to keep the Senate in check."82 These 
protections, including dividing impeachment authority between the · 
House and the Senate and "the two-thirds supermajority vote 
requirement" for a conviction, are sufficient to prevent the Senate 
from "usurp[ing] judicial power."83 In short, the relevant constitu-
tional text, structure, and history do· not support judicial review of 
the procedural aspects of the constitutionally recognized process 
for judicial removal. 
Thus, an important lesson of Nixon is that constitutional au-
thority does not exist for judicial review of every instance in which 
there is a constitutional dispute or that the absence of such au-
thority reasonably counsels or supports a finding of nonjusticiabil-
77. Id. at 737. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 738. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 739 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ja-
cob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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ity. Even so, the next Part considers the potential justiciability of 
various impeachment challenges in light of Powell and Nixon and 
the subject matter not addressed by those cases. 
III. THE PROSPECI'S FOR JUSTICIABLE IMPEACHMENT 
CHALLENGES IN THE AFTERMATH OF NIXON 
After Nixon, two possibilities exist for judicial review of im-
peachment challenges. Th~ first is that the only justiciable chal-
lenges to impeachments are for violations of explicit constraints, 
while the second is that judicial review is never permissible. I 
explore below the implications of each prospect. 
A. Treating Violations of Explicit Constraints as Justiciable 
One possibility after Nixon is that the only justiciable chal-
lenges to the impeachment process are for violations of explicit 
constitutional restraints on impeachment. In Nixon, for example, 
the Court explained that it exercised judicial review in Powel/84 
to overturn the House's decision not to seat Adam Clayton Powell 
as a representative based on his financial misconduct, because the 
House's claim that 
its power to [be the judge of its members' qualifications] was a 
textual commitment of unreviewable authority was defeated by 
the existence of [a] separate provision specifying the only qualifi-
cations which might be imposed for House membership. The 
decision as to whether a member satisfied these qualifications 
was placed with the House, but the decision as to what these 
qualifications consisted of was not.85 
The Nixon Court held, however, that a separate constitutional pro-
vision did not defeat the Senate's power to "try" impeachments as 
it saw fit.86 Yet, the Court identified four explicit constitutional 
constraints on the impeachment power: the division of impeach-
ment authority between the House and the Senate, the two-thirds 
vote requirement in the Senate for a conviction, the requirement 
of the members of the Senate to be under oath, and the dictate 
that the Chief Justice shall preside in a presidential impeachment 
-84. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
85. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740. 
86. ld. 
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trial.87 A court looking for the impeachment analogue to the pro-
vision enforced in Powell may find justiciable the failure to comply 
with any of these explicit constraints on the impeachment process, 
because they each conceivably "defeat[]" the discretion the House 
and the Senate otherwise are constitutionally authorized to exer-
cise in discharging their respective impeachment functions.88 
If violations of explicit impeachment restraints are justiciable, 
it is not difficult to conclude that the four restraints identified by 
the Nixon majority are indeed justiciable.89 Conversely, the 
hypotheticals of concern to Justices White, Blackmun, and 
Souter-the Senate's tossing of a coin90 and its summary determi-
nation that an impeachable official was "a bad guy"91-are con-
ceivably not justiciable. These hypotheticals merely suppose that in 
the extreme cases the Senate is still exercising some judg-
ment-albeit poor-in an impeachment proceeding. Even then, the 
political accountability of senators and the three explicit limitations 
on Senate proceedings mentioned by the Court act separately and 
together to make the situations posed in these hypotheticals un-
likely and to safeguard against their being undertaken lightly. By 
holding that "try" does not establish any judicially "identifiable 
textual limit"92 on the impeachment process, the Nixon Court did 
not identify any constitutional basis on which the Court may inter-
fere with the Senate's irresponsible conduct even at the extreme 
(at least in the absence of a violation of an explicit command). 
Moreover, the Court's concerns about preserving the "finality" of 
impeachment decisions and "fashioning" appropriate "relief' cut 
against any judicial interference.93 Hence, Nixon reveals some-
thing significant about the political question doctrine-that it al-
87. See id. at 736, 739. 
88. See id. at 740. 
89. See id. at 736, 739. Yet, this simplicity could be illusory. Cf. infra notes 176-91 
and accompanying text (arguing that the constraints on impeachment are evidence of its 
uniqueness). 
90. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 748 (Souter, J., concurring). 
91. Id. at 741 (White, J., concurring). 
92. Id. at 740 (majority opinion). 
93. Id. at 739. Professor Brown fails to address not only the degree to which either 
of these factors undercuts her case for judicial review of impeachments but also the fact 
that her alternative proposal to substitute standing analysis for the political question doc-
trine acknowledges the propriety of a federal court's deciding to avoid ruling on the 
merits of a claim because of the difficulties of fashioning appropriate relief. See Brown, 
supra note 5, at 144. 
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lows the Court to stand by silently while the Senate exercises very 
poor judgment-whereas a holding that would have deferred 
broadly to the Senate's actions as long as they were reasonable 
would have allowed judicial review of all impeachments to ensure 
that the Senate never acted foolishly or recklessly. 
The text and the structure of the Constitution may also be 
read as establishing other impeachment constraints ignored by the 
Court but still of sufficient clarity that their violations arguably 
might be justiciable. One example is the need for the House to 
have a majority to impeach. Moreover, the clause limiting the 
Senate's discretion by allowing it to impose after a conviction only 
the punishments of removal and disqualification94 clearly restrains 
it from imposing any other sanction, such as confinement or death. 
Similarly, Congress's impeachment authority is to be exercised only 
against the President, the Vice President, and "all civil Officers of 
the United States,"95 obviously precluding the House or Senate 
from exercising its respective impeachment power over a private 
citizen who has never worlced a day in government service.96 
Sometimes, however, a constraint is not amenable to judicial 
enforcement or has indeterminate justiciable limits. For example, 
one check on the impeachment power is the ballot box, i.e., the 
political accountability of members of Congress, which is obviously 
left up to voters rather than courts to enforce. 
Another constraint is that Congress may impeach and convict 
an impeachable official only for committing an impeachable of-
fense,97 such that someone could conceivably claim a justiciable 
violation if he were convicted and removed from office for behav-
ior that was well within his legitimate authority and not offensive 
in any way to the public's trust (such as a president's decision to 
send his child to a private rather than a public school). But in 
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not 
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States."). 
95. Id. art. II, § 4. 
96. See PETER CHARLES HOfFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 
1635-1805, at 97 (1984) (suggesting that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
"never wavered" from their agreement to limit impeachment only to officeholders, and 
therefore to differentiate the federal impeachment process from the English practice un-
der which anyone, except a member of the royal family, could be impeached). 
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of 
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."). 
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other cases, such as impeaching a federal judge for hiring only 
white male law clerks, it is difficult to settle on judicially manage-
able standards, because the existence of an impeachable offense 
depends inexorably on Congress's political judgment and on the 
particular circumstances of the alleged impeachable offense in-
volved.98 This complication is explored in more detail in the next 
Section, because it supports a broader, if not absolute, rule against 
the justiciability of impeachment challenges, given the concerns 
about finality, fashioning appropriate relief, and separation of 
powers that are implicated in any lawsuit challenging the impeach-
ment process. 
B. The Nonjusticiability of Any Impeachment Challenge 
A second, more extreme reading of Nixon is that no challenge 
to the impeachment process is justiciable. This construction de-
pends on much of the same historical and structural understanding 
that supported Nixon. Indeed, many of the same separation of 
powers concerns that led the Nixon Court to treat procedural 
challenges to the Senate's trial process as nonjusticiable would be 
present in a case involving alleged violations of the explicit con-
straints on the impeachment process. For example, the Court in 
Nixon thrice emphasized that the unique function of the impeach-
ment process as the only legislative check on the judiciary would 
be "eviscerate[d]" by judicial review.99 This threat does not dissi-
pate, at least in the case of judicial review of a judicial impeach-
ment, even if an explicit constraint is involved. 
Nevertheless, Professor Brown criticizes Nixon for being based 
on the erroneous presumption that "judicial review of [impeach-
ment] procedures is equivalent to judicial determination of out-
98. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 82-89 (describing the scope of im-
peachable offenses). · 
99. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 (1993); see id. ·at 738 (stating that 
"impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legisla-
ture," such that judicial review of impeachments would be "inconsistent with the Framers' 
insistence that our system be one of checks and balances"); id. at 739 (observing that 
judicial review of Nixon's challenge "would eviscerate the 'important constitutional check' 
placed on the Judiciary by the Framers" and that ''Nixon's argument would place final 
reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the 
impeachment process is meant to regulate") (citation omitted); id. at 739 n.2 (distinguish-
ing Nixon from two other separation of powers cases, neither of which "involved a situa-
tion in which judicial review would remove the only check placed on the Judicial Branch 
by the Framers"). 
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come."100 There are several problems with this critique. It ig-
nores the fact that the effectiveness of impeachment as the only 
political check on judicial abuse of power is weakened if it can be 
reviewed by the judiciary. Judicial review of the impeachment pro-
cess would give judges the last word on the propriety of the pro-
cedures for their own removals, and thus the chance to make such 
removals virtually impossible by demanding that Congress achieve 
them only through the most complex, time-consuming ways. The 
risk of self-interested judicial review of judicial impeachments is 
minimal only if, like Professor Brown, one trusts the judiciary 
more than Congress not to abuse its respective authority over im-
peachments.101 
The problem is that the Framers disagreed. In fact, the Fram-
ers believed that the special constraints on the exercise of the 
impeachment power, such as the political accountability of mem-
bers of Congress and the division of impeachment authority be-
tween the House and the Senate, were meant to be a "complete 
security" against its abuse.102 Moreover, it is significant, given 
their concerns about the possible conflicts of interest resulting 
from authorizing different bodies to try impeachments, that the 
Framers never mentioned, much less explored, the dilemmas posed 
by subjecting impeachments to judicial review.103 
In any event, the same arguments the Framers had for vesting 
federal impeachment power solely in Congress and not placing it 
in the federal judiciary led the Nixon Court to treat Nixon's chal-
lenges as nonjusticiable104 and support forgoing judicial review of 
any aspects of an impeachment trial. Some of the prudential con-
cerns-particularly "the lack of finality and the difficulty of fash-
100. Brown, supra note 5, at 129. 
101. ld. at 138-39. 
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 81, at 545-46. 
103. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737; see also BLACK, supra note 13, at 59, 61: 
So far as I can find, not one syllable pronounced or written in or around 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution gives the faintest color to the 
supposition that the Supreme Court [or the lower courts were] expected to have 
anything to do with impeachments, or the trial thereof, or appeals thereon. 
[Nor is there] a shred of affirmative historical evidence that the Framers 
and ratifiers of the Constitution ever thought for one moment that the lower 
courts were to deal with impeachment questions. It is quite incredible, given the 
great amount of attention paid to impeachment procedure, that this possibility 
never would have been mentioned, if in fact it had been thought a serious 
possibility. 
104. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737-40. 
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ioning relief'-that "counsel[ed] against justiciability" in Nixon105 
also apply to situations in which explicit impeachment constraints 
are violated.106 Significantly, the Nixon Court used examples 
from presidential and judicial impeachments to explain how these 
prudential factors supported a finding of nonjusticiability.107 
Given the unsettling prospect of an explicit constitutional 
violation without a judicial remedy, it may be helpful to exatnine 
more closely the degree to which the factors used for identifying a 
political question support the lack of any judicial review of an 
impeachment. Of special concern may be the extent to which 
judicial review is inappropriate in those cases-e.g., presidential 
impeachments-in which a conflict between the judiciary and the 
political process constitutionally authorized for its regulation is not 
present. In such cases, it is particularly interesting that while the 
text of the Constitution does not clearly support finding explicit 
violations to be nonjusticiable, constitutional structure and history 
plainly do. 
In fact, Article I states that the House "shall have the sole 
Power of hnpeachment"108 and that the Senate "shall have the 
sole Power to Try all Impeachments."109 Moreover, the Speech 
or Debate Clause110 has been interpreted to preclude judicial re-
view of the legitimate activities of legislators acting within their 
official duties, including impeachment.111 However, these provi-
sions do not necessarily preclude judicial review, because there 
may be other judicially enforceable limitations on the impeachment 
power.112 · 
105. Id. at 739. 
106. For two commentaries urging a similar conclusion prior to Nixon, see Gerhardt, 
supra note 69, at 97-101; Rotunda, supra note 13, at 728-32. 
107. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739. 
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
109. Id. § 3, cl. 6. 
110. See id. § 6, cl. 1: 
The Senators and Representatives shall . . . in all Cases, except Treason, Fel-
ony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Atten-
dance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning 
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not 
be questioned in any other Place. 
111. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501-07 
(1975); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 
383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); see also In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833 
F.2d 1438, 1446 (11th Cir. 1987). 
112. Nor is the textual support for nonjusticiability settled by the provision in U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
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For example, the Court in Nixon recognized that 
the concept of a textual commitment [of an issue] to a coordi-
nate political department is not completely separate from the 
concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards 
may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demon-
strable commitment to a coordinate branch.113 
Applying this principle to Nixon's challenge, the Court determined, 
after reviewing the general understanding of the term "try" in 
1787114 and its modem usage,115 that the word lacks "sufficient 
precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of 
the Senate's actions [in an impeachment trial.]"116 The Court 
found further that this construction was 
fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements 
that the Constitution does impose on the Senate when trying 
impeachments: the members must be under oath, a two-thirds 
vote is required to convict, and the Chief Justice presides when 
the President is tried. These limitations are quite precise, and 
their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose 
additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by 
the use of the word "try" in the impeachment trial clause.117 
Thus, Nixon could be read as treating violations of explicit con-
straints as presenting judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
ings." AI. the Court observed over a century ago, 
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It 
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental 
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method 
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be at-
tained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the de-
termination of the house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that 
some other way would be better, more accurate or even more just. • . . [This 
rulemaking power is,] within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the 
challenge of any other body or tribunal. 
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). 
113. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. a. 732, 735 (1993), 
114. ld. at 736 ("Older dictionaries define try as '[t]o examine' or '[t]o examine as a 
judge.'" (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF TifE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
'(1785))). 
115. ld. ("In more modern usage the term has various meanings. For example, try can 
mean 'to examine or investigate judicially,' 'to conduct the trial of,' or 'to put to the test 
by experiment, investigation, or trial.'" (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2457 (1981))). 
116. ld. 
117. ld. 
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dards of review, unlike the term "try," because those constraints 
specifically spell out the terms of their enforcement. 
Other aspects of the Constitution, however, counsel against 
the justiciability of explicit constitutional violations in the impeach-
ment context. First, treating impeachments as nonreviewable is 
consistent with the Constitutional Convention delegates' deliberate 
decision to exclude any role for the courts in an impeachment, 
except for providing that the Chief Justice should preside at the 
impeachment trial of the President.118 The Framers also believed, 
not insignificantly, that judges might be influenced by the difficult 
conflict of interest of impeaching the person who had appointed 
them or their fellow judges.119 Moreover, the Framers substituted 
the Chief Justice for the Vice President in the impeachment trial 
of a President to preclude the Vice President from presiding over 
the impeachment trial of the one official standing between him 
and the presidency.120 Given the Framers' efforts to avoid con-
flicts of interest in the administration of the impeachment process, 
it is implausible that if the Framers had accepted judicial review of 
impeachments, they would have failed to comment on the obvious 
conflicts posed by placing the Chief Justice in the position of being 
able to participate in the subsequent review of his decisions as the 
presiding officer of a presidential impeachment trial. Given the 
strong objections to the proposed impeachment process in the 
Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions,121 it is 
likely that if anyone had expected judicial review of impeachments, 
· he would have objected to or commented on potential conflicts 
with the Chief Justice's role. 
Even as staunch a friend of judicial review as Justice 
Story122 rejected its exercise over impeachments. He explained 
118. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 500, 551 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966). 
119. Id. at 398-99. 
120. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 98. 
121. See BERGER, supra note 13, at 116-17. 
122. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Introduction to JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES viii-ix (Ronald 
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833): 
Story understood that federal courts would be crucial to the enforcement of 
federal law. Indeed, Story suggested in his scholarly writings and in case dictum 
that Congress had a constitutional duty to extend the jurisdiction of lower fed-
eral courts in a way that would guarantee protection of the supremacy of the 
federal law. Whenever possible, Story would vote to extend the jurisdiction of 
federal courts. 
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that the Framers viewed Congress as better equipped than the 
judiciary to deal with the difficult political issues raised in im-
peachments.123 He noted that the Framers rejected giving the im-
peachment power to the judiciary because they believed that im-
peachment required "a very large discretion [that] must unavoid-
ably be vested in the court of impeachments."124 Justice Story 
explained further that the Framers understood the power of im-
peachment as inherently political and therefore vested the power 
solely with the House of Representatives, "where it should be, in 
the possession and power of the immediate representatives of the 
people."125 He also regarded the sanctions available to the Sen-
ate in impeachment trials as "peculiarly fit[ting] for a political tri-
bunal to administer, and as will secure the public against political 
injuries."126 
Second, impeachment decisions are laced with issues incompat-
ible with judicial review. For example, the House and the Senate 
eventually must agree, usually independently of each other, on 
what constitutes an impeachable offense.127 The Framers expect-
ed that these judgments would be guided not by indictable crimes 
but rather by amorphous notions of injury to the republic. This 
expectation is reflected in the references of the delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention to impeachable offenses as "great" 
offenses in contrast to indictable ones128 and of the delegates at 
the state ratifying conventions to the propriety of impeaching any 
official who "deviates from his duty"129 or "dare[s] to abuse the 
powers vested in him by the people."130 
123. STORY, supra note 122, § 396, at 280. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. § 407, at 290. 
126. Id. 
127. See Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 84 (noting that historically impeachment has been 
understood as a "political proceeding and impeachable offenses as essentially political 
crimes."). 
128. See BERGER, supra note 13, at 88 ("James Iredell, later a Supreme Court Justice, 
told the North Carolina Convention [during the ratification campaign] that the 'occasion 
for its exercise [impeachment] will arise from acts of great injury to the community.'" 
(citation omitted} (second alteration in original)). 
129. 4 THE DEBATES IN TilE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TilE ADOPTION OF 
TilE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836} (quoting William 
Maclaine of North Carolina). 
130. 2 id. at 169 (quoting Samuel Stillman of Massachusetts). 
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Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments in The Federalist, 
observing that 
[t]he subjects of [Senate] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial] 
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public 
men, or in other words from the abuse or violation of some 
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar pro-
priety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to 
injuries done immediately to the society itself.131 
James Wilson, who served as a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention and to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention and later 
as a Supreme Court Justice, agreed that impeachable offenses cov-
ered "political crimes.''132 Similarly, as Justice Story observed, im-
peachable offenses are "purely of a political nature''133 and defy 
classification by statute. No statutes or common law sets forth the 
impeachable offenses that courts may interpret or apply. Hamilton 
viewed this circumstance as precluding strict rules of the sort 
courts commonly apply and requiring instead a large, politically ac-
countable body to exercise the "awful discretion" necessary for 
formulating impeachable offenses.134 Thus, there are no reliable 
or clear standards against which a federal court can measure the 
propriety of Congress's judgment on whether certain misconduct 
constitutes an impeachable political crime. 
Third, as the Nixon Court acknowledged,135 judicial review 
of impeachments undermines their finality. Judicial review might 
also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the 
federal judiciary. Allowing the Chief Justice to participate in the 
judicial review of a President's impeachment trial over which the 
Chief Justice had presided would obviously be awkward. More 
importantly, it would be confusing and embarrassing and risk seri-
ous political instability at home and abroad if the Senate voted to 
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 439 {Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
132. 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania-
Of the Legislative Department, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 426 (Robert G. 
McQoskey ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Press of Harvard University Press, 1967) 
(1804). 
133. STORY, supra note 122, § 406, at 289. 
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 131, at 441. 
135. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 {1993). 
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remove the President and then a federal court countermanded that 
judgment.136 
Yet, compl~tely precluding judicial review because of these 
consequences seemingly conflicts with Powell. After all, Powell 
suggested, as the Nixon Court noted,137 that when a constitution-
al provision plainly restricts the discretion of another branch, a 
court may intervene to enforce compliance.138 Powell did not in-
volve what the Nixon Court recognized as "a situation in which 
judicial review would remove the only check placed on the Judicial 
Branch by the Framers."139 Of course, judicial review of presi-
dential impeachments does not pose a similar conflict, because as 
a group, judges are not likely to have much, if any, vested interest 
in the President's remaining in office. Nevertheless, some judges 
may feel loyal to the President because he appointed them. In 
short, Powell did not deal with the propriety of judicial review of 
a power the Framers chose not to give to the judiciary because 
they felt judges could not be trusted with it. 
Yet another basis on which to distinguish Powell, either apart 
from or in addition to the uniqueness of impeachment, is that 
Powell has not been properly understood. One could argue that 
the real problem for the House in Powell was that none of its 
existing powers for disciplining current or prospective members fit 
Powell's alleged financial improprieties. The House's expulsion 
authority required a representative to have been seated and the 
concurrence of at least two-thirds of the House;140 however, 
many members were not sure if an expulsion could be based on 
misconduct committed during a prior Congress, as would have 
been the case for Powell's infractions, and even if the House had 
such power, they were not sure they had the requisite number of 
votes.141 The other alternative-and the one chosen by the 
House-was to exclude Powell, but this authority turned on 
Powell's not having met the three standing qualifications for 
House membership. Although more than two-thirds of the House 
voted to exclude Powell, they did so only pursuant to a vote on 
exclusion. The Court refused to assume that the vote would have 
136. See id. 
137. /d. at 740. 
138. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969). 
139. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739 n.2. 
140. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5. 
141. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 508-12. 
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been the same if it had been on the question of expulsion, which 
the Court noted was not a "fungible proceeding[]" with exclu-
sion.142 Because the House chose to exercise its exclusion rather 
than its expulsion power, the Court declined to express any "view 
on what limitations may exist on Congress' power to expel or 
otherwise punish a member once he has been seated. "143 In his 
concurrence, Justice Douglas speculated that 
if this were an expulsion case I would think that no justiciable 
controversy would be presented, the vote of the House being 
two-thirds or more. But it is not an expulsion case. Whether it 
could have been won as an expulsion case, no one knows. . . . It 
well might be easier to bar admission than to expel one already 
seated.144 
In short, the House faced a no-win situation in trying to punish 
Powell because his alleged misconduct fell outside of the existing 
House disciplinary mechanisms. 
This understanding of Powell could lead one to argue, as I 
have previously, that the Court there 
could [probably] not have interfered with the decision by [the 
House] to expel Representative Powell if [it] had followed the 
constitutional standards for expulsion; however, the Court could 
step in where Congress used a procedure to accomplish imper-
missible ends. Powell indicates that while [the House] has full, 
complete, and sole power to exclude, it does not have the power 
to change expulsion into exclusion-to tum one constitutional 
procedure into another.145 
Given this understanding of Powell, judicial review of im-
peachments would be limited to determining whether the House or 
the Senate used impeachment to do something that it could do 
only under some other power, such as exclusion or expulsion.146 
142. Id. at 512. 
143. Id. at 507 n.27. 
144. Id. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
145. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 100 (citations omitted). 
146. One could go further to argue that the Court in Powell was mistaken in its 
conclusion that "the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Consti-
tution." Powell, 395 U.S. at 540. One could contend that these qualifications are fixed 
only as to the House but not as to the states or that they constitute only an irreducible 
minimum to which the House, Congress, or the states each could make an addition, if it 
chose to do so. See Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Term 
Limits Under the Qualification Clauses, 71 TEx. L. REv. 865, 866 (1993). 
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One problem with the latter reading of Powell, though, is that 
it does not preclude judicial review of impeachments altogether. It 
preserves judicial review for what would be extremely unlikely 
abuses of the impeachment power, but it implicitly accepts that all 
congressional powers have judicially enforceable limits, at least at 
the point at which one power is being improperly substituted for 
or being exercised in the place of another. Powell arguably fol-
lowed this line of reasoning by suggesting that exclusion and ex-
pulsion could be used by the House for different purposes and 
that the bases for the House's exclusion of Powell did not fit with-
in the scope of that particular power. 
For many, an even more serious problem with an attempt to 
preclude all judicial review of impeachments is that it seems un-
likely that the Court ever would agree to abdicate an entire area 
of constitutional law to another branch. This is especially true with 
respect to checks and balances; in almost every other situation in 
which the Constitution allows one branch to check another's ex-
cesses or abuses, the Court has taken the position as a mediator, 
albeit sometimes with very limited authority. For example, the 
Court has never characterized congressional control of federal 
jurisdiction as involving a political question. Moreover, some of 
the areas in which the Court has found a political question, such 
as determining the appropriate time period for ratification of a 
constitutional amendmentl47 or whether a state government is 
republican in form,148 are not as subject (at least as clearly) as 
the impeachment power to defeat by other plainly applicable 
clauses, such as the requirement of a supermajority vote for a 
conviction. Even in other areas often treated by scholars as com-
prising or involving nonjusticiable political questions, such as for-
eign affairs, the Constitution either provides no clear standards by 
which to measure the propriety of a branch's political judgment 
(such as whether the situation declared to be a war by Congress 
was one) or explicitly provides for the involvement of more than 
one branch, which has in the past given rise to confusion among 
the political branches as to whose authority should govern and the 
need for the Court to act as arbiter.149 
147. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
148. See Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 
(7 How.) 1 (1849). 
149. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Baldridge, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (declining to 
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There are two tenable responses to the reluctance to abandon 
any judicial review of impeachments. First, the Court has yet to 
find an impeachment challenge to be justiCiable. Regardless of 
what one thinks is the need for judicial review of impeachment 
challenges, the Court has never sanctioned it. Thus, as a practical 
matter, the Court has left the federal impeachment process for 
over two centuries to .the complete, unreviewable discretion of the 
Congress. 
Second, the most worrisome kinds of impeachment abuses 
have yet to occur. Even if one were inclined to find the need for 
judicial review of impeachment challenges in extreme cases, the 
likelihood of such controversies ever arising is, for all practical 
purposes, nonexistent. If one were truly interested in knowing 
what Congress is likely to do with its impeachment authority in 
the absence of judicial review, one need look no further than the 
pages of history. They do not contain any of the nightmarish epi-
sodes imagined by proponents of judicial review of the im-
peachment process. Moreover, many of the constitutional restraints 
on Congress's impeachment authority are self-defining, such as the 
supermajority vote for conviction in the Senate, such that it is easy 
for the Senate to know what it must do at a minimum in order to 
convict an impeached official and avoid obvious controversy. 
IV. THE RANGE OF NONJUSTICIABLE IMPEACHMENT 
CHALLENGES AFTER NIXON 
This Part addresses three matters arguably involving justiciable 
impeachment challenges that are likely to arise in the future. Each 
claim implicates the significance of the Constitution's allocation of 
unique impeachment authority to Congress. The first involves the 
question of whether the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause150 
hold nonjusticiable a question of statutory interpretation in a statute passed to implement 
part of an agreement between Japan and the United States); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654 (1981) (reaching merits of dispute over legality of President Carter's exec-
utive agreement for the release of United States hostages in Iran); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating President Truman's seizure of the 
nation's steel mills despite his claim that national emergency justified the seizure); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (reaching merits of congres-
sional delegation of power to the President to prohibit sale of arms to countries engaged 
in armed conflicts). 
150. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides in pertinent part: "No per-
son shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
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applies to the impeachment process, and if so, whether its viola-
tion is justiciable. The second is whether the Senate's adoption 
and subsequent failure to comply with express rules of evidence or 
a uniform burden of proof for impeachment trials is justiciable. 
The third is whether a presidential impeachment trial presents a 
special case requiring judicial review of any procedural irregulari-
ties. 
A. The Justiciability of Impeachment Challenges Based on Argu-
able Violations of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
Although the Senate followed the same procedures in remov-
ing Alcee Hastings from a federal district judgeship as it did in 
removing Nixon, Hastings challenged his removal from office in 
part on the grounds that the Senate's failure to conduct his entire 
hearing before the full body of the Senate violated the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.151 Simply put, his argument 
was that he had a property interest in keeping his judgeship and 
salary and that the government could not deprive him of these in 
an impeachment trial without due process, i.e., without following 
the proper procedures, including a complete trial before the full 
Senate.152 
To be sure, Nixon did not consider this issue because Nixon 
did not raise it. One could argue that the only justiciable challeng-
es to the impeachment process are for violations of explicit con-
straints, and might disagree over the applicability of the Due Pro-
cess Clause to impeachment, but might concur that if the Clause 
properly applied, then its violation would be justiciable. Those 
reading Nixon as indicating that no impeachment challenge is 
justiciable would argue that even if the Due Process Clause ap-
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
151. See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 504-05 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding 
Hastings's impeachment trial unconstitutional because, inter alia, it violated Fifth Amend· 
ment Due Process Clause), vacated, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) {full opinion unpub-
lished), available at 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11592 (remanding case for reconsideration in 
light of Nixon). On remand, the district court reluctantly dismissed the case without ex-
plicitly readdressing the due process claim. Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3, 5 
(DD.C. 1993) ("As strongly as this Court believes that Judge Hastings' fundamental 
rights were violated, the Court recognizes that the Nixon decision compels that Judge 
Hastings' case be dismissed."). But see BERGER, supra note 13, at 120-21 {defending ap· 
plicability of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to impeachment process). 
152. Hastings v. United States Senate, Impeachment Trial Comm., 716 F. Supp. 38, 
39~1 (D.D.C. 1989). 
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plied to impeachments, any violation of it would not be justiciable. 
The latter argument is bolstered by the Court's observation in 
Nixon that "opening the door of judicial review to the procedures 
used by the Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the 
political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of cha-
os.' "153 Even so, the central question remains about the applica-
bility and justiciability of the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause in the impeachment context. 
In spite of what appears to be the plain meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, its application to impeachments 
is unclear. For one thing, its language, upon further inspection, is 
not so plainly applicable to the unique context of an impeachment. 
The Clause explicitly provides that no "person" shall be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, whereas 
the impeachment process expressly concerns only the President, 
the Vice President, and "Officers of the United States."154 The 
primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was 
to guarantee procedural protections for private citizens against 
coercive, arbitrary governmental action.155 In contrast, the im-
peachment process is not directed at government actors in their 
private capacities. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Clause re-
quires certain procedural protections in limited circumstances 
against the arbitrary dismissal of low-level governmental employ-
ees,156 impeachment is directed at a different class of higher-level 
governmental officials. An impeachment proceeding is a unique 
forum in which Congress may demand a public accounting of the 
misbehavior of one of an elite set of officials. The question in 
153. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. a. 732, 739 (1993) (quoting Nixon v. United 
States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
154. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4. 
155. See Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1048, 1068-{)9 (1968). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra uote 12, § 132 
(describing judicial construction of "Life, Liberty or Property"); Charles E. Shattuck, The 
True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitu-
tions Which Protect "Life, Libeny, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1891) (discuss-
ing origins and meaning of due process clauses of state and federal constitutions). 
156. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 13.4, at 510 (suggesting that "if in 
dismissing the employee, the government also forecloses the individual's possible employ-
ment in a wide range of activities in both the public and private sectors, this dismissal 
will constitute a deprivation of liberty sufficient to require that the individual be granted 
a fair hearing"). 
264 DUKE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 44:231 
such a proceeding is whether an impeachable officer is fit to pre-
serve the public trust and therefore to remain in office. In other 
words, impeachment is a special disciplinary mechanism for special 
officials. The specific procedural protections given to the subjects 
of an impeachment are spelled out in the Constitution, including 
the division of impeachment authority between the House and the 
Senate and the requirements that senators act under oath, that the 
Chief Justice preside in presidential impeachment trials, and that 
at least two-thirds of the senators present agree in order to con-
vict.157 Treating impeachments as sui generis is consistent with 
the absence of any evidence that the Fifth Amendment, including 
the Due Process Clause, was ever intended to apply to the im-
peachment process.158 
The argument against applying the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to impeachment proceedings, however, seems 
forced. By its plain terms, the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause forbids Congress from depriving a "person" of "life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law;" it is not a stretch to 
think that the impeachment process, which seeks to deprive some-
one of his current and perhaps future office, could easily constitute 
a form of property. Moreover, the fact that the Fifth Amendment 
postdates the impeachment clauses makes irrelevant any of the 
Framers' or ratifiers' original desires regarding the federal im-
peachment process. The point of an amendment is to change what 
came before and that could logically cover the impeachment pro-
cess no matter how special it was conceived to be. 
Even if the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applied to 
the impeachment context, though, it is not likely that it would 
mandate anything different from the procedures otherwise re-
quired. The argument supporting application of the Due Process 
Clause to the impeachment process maintains in part that a federal 
judge has a property interest in his position. Yet, a property inter-
est for purposes of the Due Process Glause is defined as an enti-
tlement or expectation based on federal law.159 For example, a 
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
158. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the different procedural guarantees of 
the Fifth Amendment, such as the prohibition against self-incrimination should be treated 
differently for purposes of determining their applicability to the impeachment process. 
Consequently, the argument against applying the Due Process Clause to the impeachment 
process also precludes applying any of the other procedural guarantees of the Fifth 
Amendment to impeachment trials. 
159. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972}; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
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federal judge assumes office under the conditions for removal as 
spelled out in the Constitution.160 In other words, a federal judge 
has life tenure unless and until he is removed from office in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, including impeachment under 
the special procedures spelled out in the text.161 Thus, the Im-
peachment Trial Gause conceivably clarifies the reach of the Due 
Process Clause, in spite of the latter's subsequent enactment, be-
cause the former arguably defines what process is due in a judicial 
removal. 
It is also not likely that the Due Process Gause would con-
strain the Senate's discretion to conduct impeachment trials any 
more than does the term "try." The Nixon Court observed, for 
example, that the fact that the Framers set out specific limitations 
applicable only to impeachments confirms "that the Framers did 
not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the 
Senate proceedings by the use of the word 'try.' "162 The point is 
that where the Framers wanted to ensure specific constraints on 
the procedure used by the Senate for trying impeachments, they 
spelled them out in the Constitution. The process that is due in an 
impeachment trial consists of the explicit constitutional require-
ments set forth in the document. Otherwise, the Senate has 
nonreviewable discretion to conduct its hearings as it prefers. 
There is no evidence to suggest that at the time the Constitution 
was amended to include the Bill of Rights, the Framers intended 
either to revise their prior position of spelling out explicitly in the 
text the required procedures for impeachments or to add any 
other specific procedural requirements for impeachments to those 
set forth in the original Constitution.163 Thus, the Due Process 
Clause does not constrain congressional discretion any more or 
differently than does the Impeachment Trial Clause. 
supra note 12, § 13.5, at 513-16. 
160. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1. 
161. ld. art. II, § 4. See generally Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove 
Federal Judges? A Constitlllional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 215-22 (1993) (de-
scribing the Framers' rejection of political removal mechanisms other than impeachment 
and describing judicial self-regulation). 
162. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 736 (1993). 
163. See Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, 49 WASH. L. REv. 255, 268 (1973) (reviewing 
BERGER, supra note 13). 
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B. The Justiciability of Challenges to the Senate's Failure to Fol-
low Rules of Evidence or a Uniform Burden of Proof 
Another difficulty left unanswered by Nixon is whether the 
Senate's adoption of and subsequent failure to comply with specif-
ic rules of evidence or a uniform burden of proof for impeach-
ment trials is justiciable. This problem raises two interrelated ques-
tions: (1) whether the Senate has the power to tie its hands in this 
manner, and if so, (2) whether such conduct on the part of the 
Senate amounts to a waiver of the insulation or immunity from ju-
dicial review its procedural decisions otherwise enjoy to the extent 
recognized in Nixon. Each of these issues in tum raises special 
concerns. 
There are, in fact, two practical problems with the Senate's 
ability to bind each individual senator in an impeachment trial to 
follow certain rules of evidence or a uniform burden of proof. 
First, to the extent that such uniform standards deprive any sena-
tors from reaching the kind of final judgments they prefer in an 
impeachment trial, they may undermine the constitutional require-
ment of a supermajority of at least two-thirds of the Senate con-
curring in order to convict. This restriction sought to protect the 
subjects of impeachment trials from capricious abuse of impeach-
ment authority and from the tyranny of a partisan majority; it 
guaranteed that convictions could occur only if a significant minor-
ity of senators did not object.164 Any rule adopted by a majority 
of the Senate that frustrates the constitutionally authorized ability 
of a minority-i.e., one-third-of the Senate to defeat an impeach-
ment conviction is suspect. An attempt by the majority of the 
Senate, through the adoption of set evidentiary rules or a burden 
of proof, to deprive individual senators of the power that normally 
belongs to a third of the body in impeachment trials to bar convic-
tions likely would be unconstitutional. 
Second, although a majority of the Senate has the formal 
power to change the procedural rules for an impeachment tri-
al,165 the Senate traditionally permits the implementation of 
changes in its procedural rules only if it has unanimous consent to 
do so.166 The significance of this practice is that it is incon-
164. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 96, at 102-06. 
165. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (enacted). 
166. As one commentator has noted, 
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ceivable that the full Senate ever would agree to adopt a uniform 
standard of proof or set rules of evidence. Indeed, a basic princi-
ple recognized in every impeachment trial conducted thus far is 
that each senator must ultimately decide for himself on which 
rules of evidence or burden of proof to apply.167 Moreover, it is 
difficult to . conceive how such uniform standards could ever be 
enforced. In recognition of this impossibility, the National Commis-
sion on Judicial Discipline and Removal decided to forgo recom-
mending that the Senate adopt a uniform burden of proof.168 
The Commission did recommend, however, that the Senate 
adopt set rules of evidence.169 If the Senate ever succeeded in 
modifyiug its impeachment rules and practices to require the appli-
cation of uniform rules of evidence (or, for that matter, a set bur-
den of proof) in impeachment trials, the critical question would be 
whether such an action would constitute a waiver of the Senate's 
immunity from judicial review as recognized in Nixon. The settle-
ment of this issue depends on whether the Senate has the power 
to waive its constitutional immunity from judicial review. 
On the one hand, several factors argue against the existence 
of such power. These include the Framers' distrust of judges and 
consequent decision-changeable only by constitutional amend-
ment-to exclude them as decisionmakers in the impeachment 
process;170 the weakening of impeachment as a check against ex-
ecutive and especially judicial abuse of power; the conflicts of 
interest judges would have in overseeing the only constitutionally 
recognized process for their removal; and the difficulties judicial 
review would pose with respect to finality and fashioning appropri-
ate relief. 
On the other hand, in the context of administrative law, the 
Supreme Court has declared that "judicial review of a final agency 
action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is 
Both houses also have the option of setting aside particular rules, or creating 
entirely new ones, by unanimous consent. This device is especially popular in 
the Senate, where standing rules and precedents exist to control the practice. Of 
course, even those rules can always be set aside by unanimous consent. 
Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Po-
litical Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1341, 1345 {1990) (citations omitted). 
167. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 60 {1993). 
168. ld. 
169. ld. at 57. 
170. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Con-
gress."171 In other words, if a lawmaking body or administrative 
agency were really interested in barring judicial review of certain 
actions or proceedings, it may do so only if it issues a "clear state-
ment" of that wish.172 Under these circumstances, courts ask for 
a "clear statement" because they want to be sure about precisely 
how much power Congress has delegated to some politically unac-
countable body. H the Senate's adoption of evidentiary or burden 
of proof rules were construed as the functional equivalent of a 
legislative or administrative act undertaken for the purpose of giv-
ing up some of the Senate's discretion in impeachment trials, then 
waiving nonjusticiability in the impeachment context might be 
possible only if there were a "clear statement" to that effect.173 
At least one advantage of allowing the Senate to waive non-
justiciability (or to presume nonjusticiability unless there is some 
171. ·Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). The Court further stated that 
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent 
should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Id. at 141; see also Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
172. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 V AND. L. REv. 593, 597 (1992) ("Judi-
cial review does not prevent the Congress from legislating, but judicial interpretation of 
the resulting legislation requires an extraordinarily specific statement on the face of the 
statute for Congress to limit the states or the executive department."). The number of 
areas in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have required Congress to issue "clear 
statements" if it intends to displace "structural constitutional protections, especially those 
of federalism," is widespread. Id. For example, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985), the Court concluded that "Congress may abrogate the States' 
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court [by virtue of the Eleventh 
Amendment] only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute." 
173. In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized a signifi-
cant exception to this rule. The Court held that the decision of the Central Intelligence 
Agency to discharge an employee was so committed to agency discretion as to preclude 
judicial review, except for serious constitutional questions. Id. at 601. The Court based its 
holding in part on a tradition of treating the hiring or firing of employees as being with· 
in an agency's nonreviewable discretion and on there thus being "no law to apply"-i.e., 
no legislative or other kind of judicially cognizable legal standard to restrict the agency's 
discretion. Id. at 599 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410). In 
dissent, Justice Scalia went further to find constitutional questions precluded as well. Id. 
at 608-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If tradition and separation of powers concerns led the 
Court in Webster to bar judicial review of an agency decision, it is possible that similar 
factors could lead the Court to bar judicial review of an impeachment proceeding in spite 
of the Senate's failure to comply with certain procedural rules or to allow judicial review 
only if the Senate waived nonjusticiability by issuing a clear statement of its desire to do 
so. 
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clear statement to the contrary) is to make it easier for it to use 
set evidentiary rules or a uniform burden of proof by not treating 
either as legally binding in that noncompliance would not justify 
legal sanctions. Such deference seems particularly appropriate in 
the impeachment context, in which the adoption of set procedures 
for impeachment trials is likely to work to the advantage of all the 
participants by providing predictable and consistent practices or 
standards. Moreover, judicial deference makes sense in light of the 
Nixon Court's reasonable concerns that "opening the door of judi-
cial review" to impeachments is likely to produce uncertainty as to 
the "finality" of impeachment decisions174 and potentially intrac-
table problems of "fashioning [appropriate] relief."175 
Obviously, a lot turns on which presumption of judicial review 
is appropriate in this context. One possible view is that because 
judicial review of impeachment trials normally is thought not to be 
permissible, it should be presumed impermissible unless the Senate 
issues a clear statement of its intent to subject its compliance with 
certain procedural rules to judicial review. Another approach sug-
gests that impeachment proceedings are usually nonjusticiable, 
unless they violate express constitutional limits. In other words, if 
violations of express constraints are justiciable, the question is 
whether set evidentiary rules or a uniform burden of proof con-
stitute such limits, and if so, are similarly justiciable. One simple 
way to resolve this conundrum would be for the Senate, at the ap-
propriate time, to state clearly its intent to retain or to preclude 
judicial review-whichever it prefers-of its compliance with set 
evidentiary rules or a uniform burden of proof. 
C. The Nonjusticiability of Challenges to Deficiencies in Presiden-
tial Impeachments 
A presidential impeachment trial poses many of the same 
problems encountered in judicial impeachments as well as offering 
174. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 (1993). For example, it is safe to say 
that the political turmoil likely to result in the interim in which a President is contesting 
his removal would probably not be affected by the Senate's decision to adopt or forgo 
set rules of evidence or a uniform standard of proof. 
175. ld. Even if it could be established that there were violations of set rules of evi-
dence or a uniform burden of proof, it is unclear, as the Nixon Court recognized, what a 
court could legitimately order "other than simply setting aside the judgment of convic-
tion." ld. For example, it is not even clear whether a harmless error rule would apply. 
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more dramatic illustrations of the constitutional foundations for 
precluding judicial review of the federal impeachment process. I 
explore below the problems with judicial review of any aspect of a 
presidential impeachment trial. 
1. The Difficulty of Devising Proper Judicial Remedies. Some-
times it is difficult to devise a judicial remedy for a violation of an 
explicit constraint. For example, the Constitution provides that 
"[w]hen the President of the United States is tried, the Chief 
Justice shall preside."176 At first glance, the Chief Justice's failure 
to preside over a President's impeachment trial is a constitutional 
violation, which arguably may justify judicial review in a way simi-
lar to the Court's intervention in Powell to ensure that an explicit 
textual constraint has not been ignored. · 
Yet, the situation is more complex than it seems. Imagine 
further that before the President's impeachment trial is about to 
begin, the Chief Justice dies or claims a conflict of interest pre-
cluding his participation; or, after the trial begins, the Chief Justice 
refuses to participate further to protest what he views as an un-
constitutional Senate procedure.177 It is unlikely that the Senate 
would delay the President's impeachment trial so that it could 
consider confirmation of a person he has appointed as Chief Jus-
tice, who would then preside over his impeachment trial. Thus, it 
is quite probable that there would be no Chief Justice to preside 
over the presidential impeachment trial. 
Under such circumstances, one could argue that the provision 
mandating that the Chief Justice preside over a presidential im-
peachment trial has been violated but that the violation is mean-
ingless, if, for example, the most senior Associate Justice were to 
preside instead. Judicial review seems pointless here, because it 
would lead to outrageous results, compounded by further delays in 
the impeachment trial, causing substantial domestic and foreign 
confusion over who should be President of the United States. For 
example, the courts might order the Senate to schedule a confir-
mation hearing on a matter it seems to have the constitutional 
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
177. One could suppose, for example, that the Senate designates a special committee. 
to do factfinding for a presidential impeachment trial and asks the Chief Justice to pre-
side over that committee's proceedings. The Chief Justice may declare the trial 
committee's proceedings unconstitutional, and if overruled by the Senate, refuse to partici-
pate further, perhaps pending interlocutory appeal. 
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prerogative to plan as it sees fit, or it might order the President to 
appoint a Chief Justice that the Senate sooner or later would have 
to confirm (if it wanted to move forward) when it might be in the 
President's interest to delay the appointment as long as possible. 
These judicial orders would involve the courts in making or direct-
ing policy choices committed by the Constitution to political ac-
tors, and they are not as likely to preserve constitutional stability 
as to allow Congress and the President work out a mutually satis-
factory settlement. 
2. The Omnipresent Need for Finality, Especially in Presiden-
tial Impeachments. If the Senate were to use a special committee 
to do factfinding for a presidential impeachment trial, there would 
be two conceivable arguments supporting justiciability. The first is 
that the President is entitled to a trial before the full Senate be-
cause of the clause stating that the Chief Justice "shall preside" at 
his impeachment trial.178 This is a dubious basis to justify a full 
trial, however, given Nixon's holding that the Senate is the final 
arbiter of impeachment trial procedures.179 
The second argument is that the President has a special con-
stitutional status that entitles him to a particular kind of impeach-
ment trial. This argument is supported by the mandate that the 
Chief Justice preside over a presidential impeachment trial. Never-
theless, the need for finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief 
counsel against justiciability. As the Court observed in Nixon, 
there would be considerable domestic and foreign strife "if the 
President were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and 
hence his effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely 
while the judicial process was running its course, but during any 
retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its 
first judgment of conviction were invalidated."180 Even five sec-
onds of uncertainty about who is properly the President of the 
United States would put national security at risk. 
The reason for the uncertainty would be that there is no legit-
imate basis for a federal court to claim jurisdiction over a 
President's impeachment trial. To begin with, in the midst of de-
bating the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on August 27, 1787, the 
178. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
179. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735-40. 
180. Id. at 739. 
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Constitutional Convention delegates "dropped 'impeachment' alto-
gether from the list which later became, by stylistic revision, the 
list defining the Article III 'judicial power.' "181 After initially 
agreeing to postpone considering whether to extend Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to "the trial of impeachments of officers of the 
United States,"182 the delegates considered the appropriate 
phrase or clause for accurately describing or designating the scope 
of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Madison "doubted whether it 
was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court gen-
erally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought 
not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.''183 After anoth-
er delegate, Dr. Johnson, suggested "that the jurisdiction given [in 
the former phrase] was constructively limited to cases of a Judicia-
ry nature,"184 the delegates agreed to postpone consideration of 
extending the Court's jurisdiction "in cases of impeachment."185 
The critical aspect of this debate is that it occurred in the 
midst of the delegates' consideration of which cases, for whatever 
reason, would fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
The Framers took great pains to set forth as precisely as possible 
the kinds of cases they anticipated would fall properly within the 
Court's jurisdiction-those "of a Judiciary nature," as both Madi-
son and Dr. Johnson put it. Not surprisingly, given that the Fram-
ers never regarded impeachments as constituting such cases, they 
balked at the prospect of including either "the trial of impeach-
ments of officers of the United States" or "cases of impeachment" 
\vithin the original or appellate matters that would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
The fact that the Framers understood that they would have 
had to make special mention of impeachments as falling within 
federal court jurisdiction in any manner makes complete sense, 
given that judicial participation in the impeachment process had 
always been explicitly provided for in other jurisdictions with 
which they were familiar and that judicial review of impeachments 
would have deviated from the prevailing practice of their times. 
That the Framers declined to make the extension tracked the com-
181. BLACK, supra note 13, at 57 (citations omitted). 
182. 2 RECORDS OF TilE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, s11pra note 118, at 430. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 431. 
185. Id. 
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mon understanding that unless there were an explicit statement in 
the Constitution to the contrary, impeachments would remain, as 
they had always been up until then, cases of a unique nature not 
subject to judicial review. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court could claim authority over a 
presidential impeachment trial only if it had original or appellate 
jurisdiction over impeachments. The Court does not, however, 
have original jurisdiction over any kind of suit seeking to overturn 
a senatorial directive removing the President.186 
It is also implausible that the Court has appellate jurisdiction 
over impeachments. The most likely portion of Article III granting 
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over impeachments is 
that which covers "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution .... "187 The words "Law" and "Equity" are terms 
of art, referring to the two kinds of regular judicial courts in Eng-
land and the United States at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution.188 Impeachments are not technically in "Law" or 
"Equity."189 This construction is consistent with the underlying 
purpose of Article III, which has to do with regular judicial busi-
ness in ordinary courts of law, except for a passage making it clear 
that jury trial is to play no part in impeachment.190 This latter 
provision was left in Article III when the Framers shifted responsi-
bility for impeachment trials from the Supreme Court to the Sen-
ate, and therefore to Article I, dealing with the legislative 
branch.191 The Framers left this provision in place because its 
main purpose was to set forth a general rule of trial by jury, 
which logically belonged in the judiciary article, and they left in 
the reservation on impeachments to avoid any misunderstanding. 
In short, the inclusion of the term "impeachment" in Article III 
does not establish that impeachment is in any way an Article III 
matter.192 
186. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
187. ld. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
188. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 5#-45 (1928). 
189. Cf. WILSON, supra note 132, at 426 (describing impeachments as proceedings of a 
political nature, "confined to political characters," charging only "political crimes and 
misdemeanors," and culminating only in "political punishments"). 
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
191. See BLACK, s11pra note 13, at 56. 
192. Another possible argument precluding judicial review of impeachments is that 
Congress, which has the power to "make" "[e]xceptions" to the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2., has excepted snch appellate review by 
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3. The Unrealistic Need for Judicial Review. To some, all of 
the difficulties with judicial review of impeachments might argue in 
favor of allowing it only in the most extreme cases-i.e., some 
would argue that only the most minimal judicial review, around 
the outermost edges (however defined) of the process, makes 
sense. Otherwise, the Court needs to be prepared even in the case 
of a deviation from an explicit constraint to balance the need for 
judicial review against its effect on constitutional stability. 
The counterargument to this contention is that it premises 
judicial review on an unrealistic basis. This is an appropriate at-
titude to adopt in determining the propriety of judicial interven-
tion.193 The history of the federal impeachment power shows, for 
example, that even when attendance and preparation for an im-
peachment trial in the Senate have been poor, most senators have 
taken seriously (at least at the time they cast their final votes) the 
consequences of a conviction and have never considered failing to 
comply with-much less taken any steps toward violating-any of 
the explicit constitutional constraints on their power to try im-
peachments.194 The fact that members of Congress have never 
not providing for it in any statutes governing appeals to the Court. This contention is 
problematic for two reasons. First, interpreting Congress's failure to provide jurisdiction 
over impeachments to be an exception to appellate jurisdiction is risky. For example, it is 
plausible to construe Congress's failure as leaving intact the Court's appellate jurisdiction 
that otherwise exists (assuming that impeachment review does not fit within the language 
of any statute governing such jurisdiction). Second, Congress's power to except impeach-
ment from appellate review presumably enables Congress to provide for such review if it 
so desires. This possibility raises a related question about whether Congress would then 
have the power to waive nonjusticiability. The resolution of this latter issue turns on the 
same factors as determining whether the Senate may waive the rule of nonjusticiability 
set forth in Nixon by adopting but not complying with particular procedural rules. See 
supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text. In any event, it would have been a waste of 
time and effort for the Framers to have given Congress the powers to impeach and to 
make exceptions to appellate jurisdiction over impeachments, because they then would 
have enabled Congress to undo their decision to move impeachment trials out of the 
Supreme Court and into the Senate. It seems odd that the Framers would have gone to 
all this trouble without mentioning that their decision could be reconsidered and over-
turned at any time by Congress. 
193. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 217 (1882): 
Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particularly fruitful 
imagination in regard to almost every law upon which depend the rights of the 
individual or of the government, and if the existence of laws is to depend upon 
their capacity to withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law must fail. 
Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 183 
(1980) ("[C]onstitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where representative 
government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can."). 
194. See generally ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE 
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conducted an impeachment proceeding in violation of any explicit 
restraint on the process shows the degree to which those con-
straints, including the public pressure placed on Congress during 
an impeachment, have achieved their desired effect. 
Because they are so unlike anything actually ever tried in an 
impeachment, hypotheticals about tossing coins or the Chief 
Justice's failure to preside over a presidential impeachment trial do 
not supply reasonable bases for building reliable understandings of 
the justiciability of impeachment challenges. As Judge Stephen 
Williams observed in his opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Nixon, 
If the Senate should ever be ready to abdicate its responsibilities 
to schoolchildren, or, moved by Caligula's appointment of his 
horse as senator, to an elephant from tlte National Zoo, the re-
public will have sunk to depths from which no court could rescue 
it. And if the senators try to ignore the clear requirement of a 
two-thirds vote for conviction, they will have to contend with 
public outrage tltat will ultimately impose its sanction at the 
ballot box. Absent judicial review, tlte Senate takes sole responsi-
bility for its impeachment procedures as a full-fledged constitu-
tional actor, just as the framers intended.195 
Given media scrutiny and party divisions, it is difficult to conceive 
how members of Congress would ever get away with violating an 
explicit constraint on the impeachment power, especially in an 
event as closely watched as a presidential impeachment. In short, 
the unlikelihood that Congress will ever violate an explicit con-
straint on its impeachment power196 conveys something important 
about the continued effectiveness of current restraints and the 
similarly remote possibility that judicial review of the violation of 
an explicit constraint on impeachment would remedy the level of 
corruption or malfeasance that caused such a breach. 
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS (1992) (describing impeachment trials of 15 judges and 
other public officials). Of course, the plaintiff in Nixon regarded the term "try" as such a 
constraint, which was violated by the Senate's use of a trial committee. The Court 
claimed, however, that the impossibility of developing a clear, enforceable judicial con-
struction of the word differentiated it from the explicit constraints on impeachment. Nix-
on v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 736, 740 (1993). 
195. Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (1991) (footnote omitted), affd, 113 S. 
Ct. at 732. 
196. Cf. id. at 246 n.2 ("We need not decide [the permissibility of judicial review of 
the Senate's violation of an explicit constraint on its impeachment power], so we leave it 
for the unlikely day of its arising."). 
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CONCLUSION 
Nixon opened the way for better understanding of the connec-
tion between impeachments and the political question doctrine. On 
the one hand, it is clear after Nixon not only that the political 
question doctrine remains viable but also that it does so because it 
is based on constitutional text, structure, and history, as well as on 
prudent considerations about the consequences of judicial review. 
Moreover, in applying the doctrine to judicial impeachments, the 
Court in Nixon made a forceful statement about its own limits, 
that federal judges have no authority to review the procedures by 
which the Constitution permits their removal from office, and that 
there is not a judicial remedy for every conceivable constitutional 
violation.197 
On the other hand, the Nixon Court left Congress with 
nonreviewable authority to make pivotal decisions about its pre-
ferred procedures for removing some of our most important feder-
al officials. This prospect unsettles many pe9ple, who trust largely, 
if not exclusively, in the Court to make constitutional law. In 
other words, Nixon tells us that Congress too may make constitu-
tional law. Of course, whether Congress has the authority to make 
judgments about the Constitution in the area of impeachment that 
are final vis-a-vis the other branches is a different issue from how 
well it makes constitutional law. Yet, it is fair to say that whatever 
one thinks of Nixon, the Court merely remained silent about 
something that has been going on without judicial review since the 
beginning of the republic. The fact that many constitutional law 
scholars were eager to end this practice says a great deal about 
their faith in judicial review. After Nixon, the time has come for 
these same people to ( re )consider their faith in the Framers who 
did not trust any judicial involvement with the administration of 
the federal impeachment process. 
197. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that "(c]ourts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have 
the capacity to govern" and rejecting the "assumption that the responsibility for the pres-
ervation of our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of 
government, or that it alone can save them from destruction"). 
